《伟大产品背后的那些伟大的女性产品经理(I)》–WORD FOR MAC–Martina Lauchengco:为客户做正确的事

编者注

在产品经理人群中,通常被认为是男性的天下,在2017年,中国女性产品经理只占27.59%(数据来源于《2017年中国产品管理者现状》调查报告),而在国外,要比国内的情况好一些,女性产品经理也只有40%(数据来源于《2018年美国产品管理者调查报告》)。

当然,如果放到一个较长的时期看,女性产品经理的比例还是在不断增长,这也充分说明在产品经理这个圈子里,女性产品经理已经开始成为一个不可忽视,也不能忽视的群体。

尽管我们说女性从事产品管理工作有这样或那样的优势,但我们还是更多在阐述她们的劣势,但事实上,我们能看到的很多伟大的产品其实都是这些女性产品经理的杰作。

坚韧、创新、变革、这些似乎和女性不太沾边的产品经理特质,其实在她们的身上也会体现的淋漓尽致。

这篇长文并非我原创,而是我偶尔看到的一篇国外的讲稿,原标题是《Every Great Product》(每个伟大的产品),但是我在读完该文后,发现文中所举的案例竟然都是女性产品经理的作品,因此,我对该文进行了重新的整理,并把名字改成了《伟大产品背后的那些伟大的女性产品经理》,我希望从这个视角来说明我的一个观点:性别不会阻挡女性成为一个优秀的产品经理。

在本文中,一共会展示五位优秀的女性产品经理,分别是:

WORD FOR MAC – Martina Lauchengco

NETFLIX – Kate Arnold

GOOGLE ADWORDS – Jane Manning

APPLE ITUNES – Camille Hearst

ADOBE CREATIVE CLOUD – Lea Hickman

同时,为了更好的让大家阅读,我对原文进行了简单的翻译,当然,翻译水平有限,英文好的朋友可以自行翻译阅读,英文不好的朋友就凑合着看吧。


In 1993, Word 6.0 was the biggest release, feature-wise, Microsoft had ever produced up until then.

在1993年,Word 6.0是微软迄今为止发布的最大的版本。

In addition to all the new features, the team had another very large objective.Their code base had diverged and it was extremely slow and costly for Microsoft to be implementing Word separately for each platform: Windows, DOS and Mac.This code convergence effort was supposed to save Microsoft substantial development time, and also – they tried to convince themselves – improve the offering since Word would have the same features on every platform.

除了所有的新特性之外,这个团队还有另外一个很大的目标。对于微软来说,他们的代码库分化是极其缓慢而昂贵的,微软要实现为WORD分割到每个平台:Windows, DOS and Mac。代码融合努力被期望应该节省大量开发时间,同时,他们也试图让自己相信,改善提供的WORD会在每一个平台上有相同的特性。

It also meant that there was great pressure to get the release out so they could start to gain the efficiencies of a single code base.

这也意味着发布版本的压力很大,因此他们可以开始获得单个代码库的效率。

At the time, Word for Mac was a relatively small market. It was only $60M vs. Windows which at that point was more than a $1B market.

当时,Mac的Word市场规模相对较小。与Windows相比,只有6000万美元,而windows超过了10亿美元。

If you remember back then, Windows machines absolutely dominated, and even the future of Apple was not a sure thing.

如果你还记得当时的情况,Windows电脑绝对是主流,而Apple未来是什么样都不知道。

However, the Mac community was also very vocal, with passionate fans of their platform, and is also important to note that this community had very little love for Microsoft.

不过,Mac社区也有非凡的声音,在这个平台上有热情的粉丝,而且值得注意的是,这个社区对微软几乎没有什么好感。

PowerMacs were just hitting the market, which had significantly faster chips and more memory. Most of the team were using those new computers because the Word 6.0 beta in it’s early days was just too slow on regular Macs.

PowerMacs刚刚进入市场,它拥有更快的芯片和更多的内存。这个团队的大多数人都在使用这些新电脑,因为在早期,Word 6.0 beta在普通的mac电脑上太慢了。

Of course, most of the Mac user base was not on new PowerMacs, they were on ‘regular’ Macs — hardware upgrade cycles were much slower then.

当然,大多数Mac用户都不在新的PowerMacs上,而是在“常规”Mac上——硬件升级周期要慢得多。

So when Microsoft released the most “full-featured word processor ever for the Mac” that crawled on their Macs — we’re talking literally two minutes to startup– the community immediately started posting in newsgroups that Microsoft was actually trying to “kill the Mac.”

因此,当微软发布了有史以来最“功能齐全的Mac文字处理软件”,在他们的Mac电脑上爬行时——我们不夸张的说,软件两分钟后才启动——社区立即开始在新闻组中发帖,称微软实际上是在“杀死Mac”。

Hate mail started streaming in from everywhere – including emails directly to Bill Gates who would forward them on to the team with messages like “this is depressing MSFT’s stock price. Fix it.”

仇恨邮件开始从四面八方涌来——包括直接发给比尔•盖茨的邮件,盖茨会把这些邮件转发给团队,并附上诸如“这压低了微软金融时报的股价”之类的信息。修复它。”

Enter Martina Lauchengco, a young product manager recently out of Stanford, whose job it was to help turn this around.

刚从斯坦福大学毕业的年轻产品经理Martina Lauchengco,他的工作就是帮助扭转局面。

The team quickly learned that while it may be a worthwhile objective to get to a common code base, it’s an empty victory if the product that results is not good. Moreover, users choose their devices and platforms because they value what’s different, not the same.

团队很快认识到,虽然获得一个通用代码库可能是一个有价值的目标,但如果产品的结果不好的话,那将是一个无意义的胜利。此外,用户选择他们的设备和平台是因为他们看重不同的东西,而不是相同的东西。

From the customer’s point of view, they would rather wait a little longer and have a better platform-specific solution, than simultaneously ship a generic product on all platforms.

从客户的角度来看,他们宁愿等待更长一点的时间并拥有更好的特定于平台的解决方案,也不愿在所有平台上同时发布通用产品。

The team ended up focusing hard on performance, and taking advantage of what the Mac could do.

这个团队最终专注于性能,并利用了Mac的优势。

They looked at things like when and how to load fonts since Mac users tended to have so many more than Windows users, and ensuring all Mac keyboard shortcuts still worked.

他们研究了诸如何时以及如何加载字体的问题,因为Mac用户的字体往往比Windows用户多,并且确保所有Mac键盘快捷键仍然有效。

They focused on things like Word Count which is used 10 times a day by every press person to make sure that it was lightning fast, as the press used the feature as their performance barometer. They even made it faster than the feature on Windows.

他们把注意力集中在诸如Word Count之类的事情上,这是因为每个新闻工作者每天都要使用10次,必须确保其速度极快,因为媒体将这一功能作为他们的表现晴雨表。他们甚至让它比Windows上的功能还快。

The result was that in a couple of months, they produced a 6.1 release that was sent to every registered user with an apology letter – signed by Martina – along with a discount coupon for future purchases.

结果是,在几个月后,他们制作了一个6.1版本发送给每个注册用户,并伴有Martina签名的一封道歉信,以及未来购买的折扣券。

The release succeeded in fixing the perception problems, but more importantly, it genuinely made the version dramatically better for the Macintosh – a product the Mac team could actually be proud of, and what the team felt they should have delivered to market in the first place.

这个版本成功地解决了感知问题,但更重要的是,它真正让这个面向Macintosh的版本戏剧般的变好了——这是Mac团队实际上可以为之自豪的一个产品,也是团队认为他们应该首先交付给市场的产品。

This is a good example of how hard it can be to do the right thing for the customer, often in the face of pretty massive pressures, but that’s exactly what strong product managers figure out how to do.

这是一个很好的例子,说明为客户做正确的事情是多么的困难,通常是面对巨大的压力,但这正是强大的产品经理想要做的。

In subsequent years, not only did Microsoft once again decide to diverge the code base, they completely separated the teams into different buildings and business units, and had them fully embrace all things Mac. Strategically it was a complete 180.

在接下来的几年里,微软不仅再次决定将代码库分开,还将团队完全分割成不同的构建和商业单元,并让他们完全接受Mac的一切。从战略上讲,这是一个180度大转弯。

It’s hard to estimate just how important this was to both Microsoft and to Apple.Even today, more than 20 years later, many businesses and consumers consider Word and the rest of Office absolutely essential to being able to use their Mac for business and personal use.What started then became a multi-billion dollar win for both Apple and Microsoft. There are more than 1 billion Macs and PC’s running Office around the world.

很难估计这对微软和苹果来说有多重要。即使在20多年后的今天,许多企业和消费者仍然认为Word和其它的Office组件对于能够将Mac用于商业和个人用途是绝对必要的。从那时开始,苹果和微软都赢得了数十亿美元的胜利。全世界有超过10亿台mac电脑和个人电脑在运行着Office。

Martina has gone on to have a remarkable career, in both product management and product marketing.From Microsoft she went on to Netscape, where she was responsible for marketing of the Netscape Browser, and then LoudCloud, and now I’m happy to say she’s been my partner at SVPG for over a decade, and she also teaches marketing at UC Berkeley.

玛蒂娜在产品管理和产品营销方面都取得了卓越的成就。从微软到网景,她负责网景浏览器的营销,然后是LoudCloud,现在我很高兴地说她是我在SVPG已经超过十年的合作伙伴。她也在加州大学伯克利分校教授市场营销。

Let me also add that there’s little as powerful as a marketing person that’s also strong at product. The combination is amazing.

我还要补充一点,强有力的营销人员在产品上也是强大的。结合是惊人的。



分享到QQ 分享到微信 分享到微博

0 条评论

发表我的观点

取消

  • 昵称 *
  • 邮箱 *
  • 网址